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New Sciences and our Future

Maintainer: Annette Schlemm, Version 1, 16.03.2004
Projekt-Typ: halboffen
Status: Archiv

(1) As part of the oldest experiences it is already known that there are head and wall...
To have it one’s own way only is immature, to not see more than the wall is outdated.
(Bloch 1954: 531f.)

Knowing and Acting

(2) Our task to find „Human strategies in complexity“ is directed by using scientific thinking. Our culture “has always included scientific rationality as its basic value” (Stepin 2003: 109). But since the 20th century there have been grown doubts about the role of rationality. Often the difference between “understanding” (Verstand) and “reason” (Vernunft) is forgotten. Rightly the sole use of understanding is criticised, but we have a hard time to use reason.

(2.1) Re: Knowing and Acting, 16.03.2004, 22:16, Annette Schlemm: More about the difference of understanding and reason see http://www.thur.de/philo/hegel/hegel_en1.htm

(2.1.1) Knowing and Acting , Vernunft vernehmen, 16.03.2004, 22:56, Uwe Berger: Interessting to compare: in french there is no simular word for "verstehen" (only ´comprendre´), so french people have the feeling to have less than her neighbours. I think it´s the same question like: how do you can take care without doing anything? season-ally observation :) the former meaning of obeir was "to lent the ear" now we throw an eye on something. Not allowed to tuch, more about taking act and blowingknowing...

(3) Maybe the „New sciences“ can help us. This new “post-non-classical” sciences (Stepin 2003: 85) like synergetics and concepts of self-organisation have new characteristics, which are more similar to a moving and interconnected world than the classical sciences and the “non-classical” sciences like quantum theory and (special or general) theory of relativity. To my mind, the enthusiasm about the paradigm shift sometimes runs away with us. I would like to suggest to stop and have a break to reconstruct the foundations of our scientific thinking in general. We need careful differentiations to get new integrated outlooks. If we see only correspondences of the new sciences with our desired worldviews we’ll get only a flatland-unity (or “fusion”, Wilber 1996: 11) of sciences and philosophy, a “unification” (Hofkirchner 2003: 133), not an “integration”.

(3.1) new scientific thinking, 16.03.2004, 23:19, Uwe Berger: To feel is science. To steal searches to be scientifically proven. To heel is sealing with reason. But - do you know why?

(4) Therefore I want to look at the relation between science and worldview altogether. To understand what science really is I have to explain how science works and what its tasks are (in difference to philosophy). Because this topic is very complicated I only deal with physics, as a fundamental and typical single science (mostly following Borzeszkowski and Wahsner). The founded epistemological speciality is also valid for the physical theories of self-organisation and synergetics. About self-organisation as a universal science and its relation to philosophy I spoke in Salecina (Schlemm 2003b). The shown necessity of epistemological preassumtions explains why science has its own limits. We’ll have to take these limits into consideration if we want to use science to build an adequate worldview. Under this conditions science itself doesn’t enable us to explain and predict in a strong deterministic manner, but to understand the variety of possibilities in the world. Science can’t and needn’t say us what to do. But it can tell us about possibilities and ways to create new possibilities in our acting.

(4.1) Do it with a clear conscience., 16.03.2004, 23:47, Uwe Berger: horse-radish is a creator in our acting. mustard seeds bustards feeds custards deeds also

The epistemological foundation of Single Sciences

(5) The Relation between Science and Worldview
Developing transdisciplinary needs deeper insights into the work of sciences. A detailed analysis of physics is already done by Borzeszkowski and Wahsner (see references). Probably much of their results are valid in other single sciences too, if the concrete epistemological preassumtions are adapted. The “principle of observability”, which “stresses the limitations and relativity of our ideals” (Budanov, Savicheva 2003: 178) does not only exist in synergetics but in all sciences. “The way we see reality is the way we see reality“ (Myelkow 2003, 82). The fact that there are special epistemological preassumtions distinguishes single sciences from philosophy. Before the hasty declaring of scientific results as philosophic worldviews we have to analyse the given epistemological preassumtions in each case.

(5.1) What you see is what you get, 16.03.2004, 23:53, Uwe Berger: if there is a different way to see, is there reality? How somehow get the sameway alpha/omega-alevvy

(6) Since Enlightenment our worldview has been tightly connected with scientific results. We use „the scientific picture of the world as a reference point for new worldview” (Stepin 2003: 109). But there remains a difference between a single-science-theory and a (philosophical) worldview. “Mechanics” is the term for a physical theory with all limits of such a theory. A mechanistic worldview may be fed by such a theory, but it isn’t the same. Therefore it’s not correct to say, that Galileo and Newton “were very successful in describing the universe using this reduced mechanistic worldview” (Brunner, Klauninger 2003: 31). Although “Descartes introduced strict determinism into the methodology of science” (ibid.), Newton didn’t follow him and even though “La Place stated that the universe was comparable to a clockwork of infinite precision” (ibid.) these sentences don’t characterise modern-aged science at all.

(6.1) 16.03.2004, 22:17, Annette Schlemm: Therefore “The Newtonian word-view was characterised by its believe in absolute immutability of nature and a reductionistic methodology” (Fuchs 2003: 200) is not the right interpretation. Firstly we have to differ between the Newtonian physics and the “Newtonian worldview”. In order to give the possibility to measure motion, the definition of etalons and rigid bodies are necessary – and this scientific measuring-theoretical preassumtion distinguishes physics as science from worldviews as parts of philosophy. If “the Hegelian philosophy of nature systematically incorporates all that is denied by Newtonian science” (Prigogine, Stengers 1986: 96) – what can this say about physics as science? Science can’t be matched with philosophical standards! (see more in the next chapter).

(6.1.1) matches to light, 17.03.2004, 00:22, Uwe Berger: Perhaps science can be sludged with philosophical standarts ?

(7) Such a characterisation of modern science since Galileo and Newton would be a reductionism of only one interpretation, like the interpretation of Newton by Voltaire (see Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1981 and also Wahsner 1994).
To specify the relation of science and philosophy it will be helpful to analyse the work of science in detail.

Epistemological Foundations of Single and Universal Sciences

(8) What have Natural Sciences to do?
I think it is accepted that science has to do with universals.

(8.1) Re: Epistemological Foundations of Single and Universal Sciences, 16.03.2004, 22:18, Annette Schlemm: Hegel distinguishes between the abstract-“universal” and the real universal: “The notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract generality, and on that account it is often described as a general conception. We speak, accordingly, of the notions of colour, plant, animal, etc. They are supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the particular features which distinguish the different colours, plants, and animals from each other, and by retaining those common to them all. This is the aspect of the notion which is familiar to understanding; and feeling is in the right when it stigmatises such hollow and empty notions as mere phantoms and shadows. But the universal of the notion is not a mere sum of features sermon to several things, confronted by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the contrary, self-particularising or self-specifying, and with undimmed clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis. For the sake both of cognition and of our practical conduct, it is of the utmost importance that the real universal should not be confused with what is merely held in common. All those charges which the devotees of feeling make against thought, and especially against philosophic thought, and the reiterated statement that is is dangerous to carry thought to what they call too great lengths, originate in the confusion of these two things.” (Hegel Enc.I: 312, transl. by W.Wallace)

(9) The results of science are sentences about universals.

(9.1) 16.03.2004, 22:18, Annette Schlemm: Bertrand Russell wrote: „Science […] is knowledge of a certain kind, the kind, namely, which seeks general laws connecting a number of particular facts. (Russell 1931/2001: xxvii)

(10) But the form doesn’t characterise the complete content. And the question remains how scientists get their results.
Some theories of science assume that the world would be an amount of individuals. The mainstream-philosophy of science is based on Bertrand Russell who expressedly emphasised that all relation between things must be external relations, not internal, because otherwise mathematics wouldn’t work. We can think the world as an manifold assembly of things connected by relations and we don’t need to take into consideration the whole (Russell 1992: 161). Most theories of science reject “metaphysicism”. But there is another philosophy of science, which proceeds from the assumption that the world is a self-developing whole through inner contradictions. It is not a blurred, mashed monotony but a “self-particularising or self-specifying” (Hegel Enc.I: 321) ever-processing totality. Now we have to ask how we come from the inexhaustible, but subdivided whole to our knowledge and which relationship our knowledge has with this world.

(11) We are parts of the world, we participate in its totality – but we are only finite moments. All our relations within the world are finite, several relations grasp several aspects of the world. Art, Work and also science are such relations. Relations realize the unity of the moments – but the moments differ from each other in some aspects. The difference between knowledge-subject and object is mediated through means of cognition. Often these means are hidden or forgotten. Means are not only technical devices, but also theoretical preassumtions or hypotheses, models and mathematics. (Hörz 1966: 63f.). Like technical devices the other means are changed in scientific development. Ernst Bloch stressed that the questions to nature, the region of the experiencability (Raum des Erfahrbaren) and the audible answers will change with the change of society (Bloch MP: 341). Therefore no knowledge is complete “true”, no knowledge shows or represents the world without the difference given by means of cognition. And no means are more “natural” than others. Goethe criticized the artificiality of Newton’s means (Goethe 1833: 21). He tried to use only “natural” means of cognition. Human beings are a special status of nature. Therefore all that humans can do, is realisation and expanding possibilities of nature. Nothing is “unnatural”.

(12) Different means of cognitions (like Goethe’s and Newton’s) offer us different parts of knowledge, and we can’t speak about the “truth” of knowledge without speaking about the respectively used means of cognition. In this sense neither Goethe got the “whole truth” about colours nor did Newton.

Motion is the Topic of Physics

(13) Physics deals with non-living things and their behaviour. The topics of modern-aged physics are not properties (like the former occult qualities), but the behaviour of things. The focus on behaviour stresses that no object, no thing is absolutely isolated. Objects in physics (since Galileo) are idealized – but (since Newton) never fully isolated.

(13.1) Re: Motion is the Topic of Physics, 16.03.2004, 22:18, Annette Schlemm: In our everyday-opinion things seem to have properties which belong to the thing independently of its interactions. Bodies have a (inertial) mass. It describes the resistance/inertia of the body against accelerations. We see: mass is defined with respect to the interaction of the body. The inertial mass belongs to the standard motion (inertial motion) and “this inertia is mainly linked with the measurement-theoretical determination of space-time; and gravity is mainly linked with the interacting matter” (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 60) Both masses “do not designate properties of the objects for themselves but they have sense and meaning only within the framework of the theory of motion.” (Ibid.: 59)

(14) Therefore we can relieve the reproach of mechanicism. The Newtonian Mechanics is not a theory with particles (Bloch’s “block-matter”- “Klötzchenmaterie”) and pushes.

(14.1) 16.03.2004, 22:18, Annette Schlemm: Descartes and other previous scientists and philosophers didn’t know the difference between impulse (p=mv) and force (F=ma). They often had the imagination of a body which is moved by an impulse – like in a billiard. Especially Descartes developed a hypothesis of a worldview of impulse-moved particles in whirls of liquidity (Descartes 1644/1870: 108).

(15) Because the Newtonian Theory bases on the Galilean law of inertia ( “Every body remains in its state of rest or in rectilinear uniform motion unless it is forced to change its state by acting forces”) rest isn’t the base and motion isn’t pushed by impulses or forces. Rectilinear uniform motion is the base (the standard motion) and rest is only one special case.

Thus mechanics makes the necessary cut not between rest and motion but between rectilinear uniform motion and accelerated motion, cut in the sense that the first is supposed to be a motion etalon and that only motions deviating from it are explained by physical dynamics. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1998: 17)
Newton took the Galilean law as the preassumtion of his Mechanics.

(15.1) 16.03.2004, 22:19, Annette Schlemm: This doesn’t mean that this preassumtion can be or has to be justified outside the theory itself. All measuring quantities get their meaning only within the theory.

(16) To define a rectilinear uniform motion we need the Euclidian space. In this sense Newton defined his absolute space and absolute time as a preassumtion of the dynamics. This space and this time is not the “real” space and time, it is an epistemological preassumtion.

(16.1) 16.03.2004, 22:20, Annette Schlemm: Leibniz tried to work without such a standard motion but he and his disciples never could establish another form of mechanics. For instance, they were not successful to unify the three Kepler’s laws with their physical hypothesis.

(17) Because of these preassumtions in the Newtonian theory motion is not an external induced property, it is the topic of physics itself. There is no resting, isolated thing!

(17.1) 16.03.2004, 22:19, Annette Schlemm: Another example: The measurable quantity “heavy mass” describes the behaviour of bodies in a gravitational field produced by other things with heavy mass. “It does not make any sense to say about a single body (a body for itself) that it is heavy.” (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 59)

(18) This corresponds to the remarked meaning of behaviour instead of properties. We see that the appropriate understanding of the “boring” Newtonian Mechanics can show us some important features of the “most mechanical” science, which is often misinterpreted. The topics of physics are not the bodies themselves but the changes of their behaviour, of their motion which are described by measurable quantities and forces (not as “causes” of the change of motion but because they are equivalent to them).

The Problem of Contradictions

(19) Motion as the topic of physics carries a problem: the problem of the contradictions of motion, known since Zenon:

Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this 'here', it at once is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted the contradictions that they pointed out in motion; but it does not follow that therefore there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself. (Hegel WdL II: 76, transl. by Miller)

(19.1) Re: The Problem of Contradictions, 16.03.2004, 22:21, Annette Schlemm: In German: „Es bewegt sich etwas nur, nicht indem es in diesem Jetzt hier ist und in einem anderen Jetzt dort, sondern indem es in einem und demselben Jetzt hier und nicht hier, indem es in diesem Hier zugleich ist und nicht ist. Man muß den alten Dialektikern die Widersprüche zugeben, die sie in der Bewegung aufzeigen, aber daraus folgt nicht, daß darum die Bewegung nicht ist, sondern vielmehr, daß die Bewegung der daseiende Widerspruch selbst ist.“ (Hegel WdL II: 76)

(20) Eleatics thought that the world could not be in such contradicting motion, because we can’t recognise such a world. The Heracliteans assumed that the world is an ever-moving world, but they approved that we couldn’t recognize it. Renate Wahsner showed (Wahsner 2002: 460), how the Atomists found a way out: If there would be moving things (atoms) and, in addition, an area of emptiness, we can imagine and recognise motion of the atoms through the empty space.


(21) Contradictions of motion became thinkable without logical contradictions because of this distinction between matter and space. Such an epistemological distinction was called “dualism” by R. Wahsner and H.-H.v. Borzeszkowski (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1998: 15).

(21.1) Re: Dualism, 16.03.2004, 22:21, Annette Schlemm: We mustn’t mix this epistemological dualism with an ontological assumption about a duality of the world. This dualism doesn’t mean that the world itself is dualistic.

(22) Dualism is a means of cognition. Immanuel Kant understood the epistemological function of the Newtonian absolute space and time. Absolute space and time is a preassumtion for physics, it is not explained by the theory, it is not a part of the explained real world. Kant assumed that the a priori assumption will always be the same. Now we know that the change of them is typical for progress in evolution of science. And these preassumtions not only deal with space and time. We find this feature of science also with respect to the cut between the rectilinear uniform motion (a priori presupposed as the standard motion) and accelerated motion (equivalent to dynamical forces). It is necessary to enable us to measure some forms of behaviour of the objects.

Each measurable quantity and calculating science is based on thought determinations not explained by this science but presupposed by it. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1988: 289)

(23) Physics does not only need thinking without logical contradictions. It needs a connection to the real world, given by objective sensuousness (gegenständliche Sinnlichkeit) mediated by experiments and measurements. Therefore the preassumtions of such experiments and measurements are especially important as means of cognitions in physics and similar single sciences.

(23.1) 16.03.2004, 22:21, Annette Schlemm: Therefore it would be a mistake to assume that classical sciences would work without such means. Myelkov (Myelkov 2003: 77) shows the classical, “immediate” relation between law and events/facts in classical sciences without such means. This picture follows an abstract-logical analysis of natural laws which have lost the content of the scientific work. Myelkov stresses that non-classical science takes into consideration “means of observation” and post-non-classical sciences the sense of an event in addition. It would be interesting to look carefully, in which way means of cognition are used in classical sciences too and how they are hidden. I think, all (single)sciences use such means, but the mainstream-theory of science ignores them in classical sciences at least.

(24) Experiments and measurements in modern physics are not “unnatural” – but they are means produced by human beings in order to recognise the world. If we want to understand the relationship between world and our knowledge we must take into account our means, too.

Measurable Quantities

(25) Physics doesn’t deal with the real self-contradicting things. It deals with some aspects of their behaviour which can be described by Mathematics and which can be compared with reality by experiments and measurements. These are the measurable quantities. Measurable quantities require comparisibility. But like Nicholas of Cusa already knew, in reality there is no thing which has exactly the same qualities like another thing (Cues: 35,73). But there is also order, harmony and proportion (ibid. 75), and we have to find out how to compare several qualities within this framework. Hermann Helmholtz pointed out that “for deciding about equality, it is necessary to know the method according to which the comparison is to be made” (Helmholtz 1903/1984: 38). Measurable quantities are produced by humans , they are “measurement-theoretically determined thought entities” (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 64).

(25.1) Re: Measurable Quantities, 16.03.2004, 22:22, Annette Schlemm: Whereas the constructivists (Lorenzen 1964/1988; Lorenzen 1987) assume they could (re)construct the construction of measurable quantities like velocity, mass, charge and so on before dealing with physical theories (dynamics); Wahsner and Borzeszkowski stress that the theory of measurable quantities can’t be finished before the actual physics begins (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1992: 250). The theory determines what measurable quantities are required.

(26) These quantities are not fully arbitrary – they have to correspond to real equalities of behaviour. Such a quantity is an abstraction in this sense: we build nouns from verbs (compare Helmholtz 1903/1984, 23). But the abstraction is not a mathematical one: We do not only get abstract abstract possibilities of behaviour, we get actual possibilities.

(27) For physics the measurable quantities appear as its objects, but the epistemological analysis shows that they are actually means of cognition.
In the measurable quantities we can see also the open explained dualism. The measurable quantities time (t) and space-coordinates (q) belong to the epistemological preassumtions, the measurable quantity velocity (v) in kinematics and acceleration (a) in dynamics belong to the theory.

(28) We can prove how this dualism takes the dialectical contradiction of motion as dualism: The contradiction of motion is that “something … at once is and is not”. Beside time (t) and space (q) we use a third quantity velocity (v), which implies a reference to other places. “This does not result in a logical contradiction because there are two different quantities that are algebraically independent from each other and that can be assigned to the same body at the same time point t.” (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 13)

Physics conceives the (dialectical) contradiction in the form of dualisms in such a manner that it separates the momenta existing only in a unity and distributes them to the different sides of dualism […] (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 2001: 43)

Universal Sciences

(29) The epistemological means of each single science differs from the epistemological means of another single science. The mediation of knowledge subjects and objects depends on the concrete quality of the objects (physical, biotical or social characteristics are distinguished).
In system theories like cybernetics it found that all objects have also comparable behaviour. The topic of the universal sciences is such comparable, common behaviour. In electrical engineering was found that there exists an common law: “effect = characteristic of the system x cause” (see Wunsch 1985: 35). Later cybernetics became the general theory of behaviour of any objects as elements within systems. Systems are an“ordered whole” (Liebscher 1996: S. 860) of a set of elements and relations between them (Steinbacher 1999: 1579). Such systems can maintain themselves and sometimes also generate themselves. We speak about autonomy and autopoiesis (more in detail see Collier 2003). This leads the attention to the inner dynamic of the systems. But the abstraction from the concreteness leads to a distinction of the concrete thing from its behaviour. Only the behaviour is a topic of general sciences. “The question isn’t what a thing is, but what it does” (Ashby 1974). But this abstraction takes the concrete sources of development away. We speak about evolution, we can formalise not only continuous change, but discontinuous behaviour at bifurcation-points too. But we lost the concrete sources of development within the quality of the things themselves. Therefore the “problem of emergence” emerges. We can describe evolution, but we can’t explain it really.

(29.1) Re: Universal Sciences, 16.03.2004, 22:23, Annette Schlemm: More about this see http://www.thur.de/philo/project/salecina/salecina.htm

Foundations of Theories of Self-Organization

(30) Theories of self-organization belong in a more narrow sense to a special field of physics, thermodynamics, and in a wider sense to system-theory.
Self-organization in thermodynamics bases on the same epistemological foundations like physics at al. Thermodynamics uses measurable quantities like other fields of physics and its relation to reality doesn’t differ from other fields of natural science.

We call models thermodynamic, which refer to thermodynamic quantities, such as amount of substance, energy, entropy and their flows. (Ebeling 1990: 36)

(31) It was said that “irreversible thermodynamics is the actual realistic thermodynamics because all real processes are always irreversible” (Schnakenberg 1998). But there is no question which theory would be “more realistic”. Every scientific description (reversible and irreversible thermodynamics too) bases on preassumtions, which don’t allow an ontologisation of their categories.
And there is another argument against the idea that the theory of self-organization would be quite another world-view than “older” physics:

Since there is no sharp boundary between dynamical physics and thermodynamics (because time-directed solutions may be deduced from the basis laws under certain supplementary conditions), we might suggest that the second law of thermodynamics can be derived from the laws of dynamical physics, too, by assuming supplementary conditions. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1988: 292)

(32) New aspects of physics of self-organization are the consideration of non-equilibrium-processes and the possibility of changing quantities in leaps and bounds.
But like Borzeszkowski and Wahsner showed, “the new features in regard to time appearing in thermodynamics are not founded on the dynamical laws but rather on supplementary conditions compatible with them.“ (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1988: 294) And because thermodynamics doesn’t deal with the specific quality of the processing things, it can’t explain real evolution. The specific universality (thermodynamic systems as its objects) is the advantage of the thermodynamic theory of self-organization but also it gives reason for its limits.

(33) Of course the process of cognition seems to be a “dialog” now (Prigogine, Stengers 1986) – but there is nothing said about specific (concrete, historical) means of cognition! The object doesn’t become a “subject”, like a subject is defined in philosophy (a self reflecting self-confidenced being). There is nothing said except the general knowledge, that the “nature recognizes itself”, because human beings belong to nature too. But to characterise recognizing beings as natural beings and subjective beings we need more than the abstract theory of self-organisation. The new aspect of self-organization as an universal theory in comparison with physics is that its universal is more abstract than the physical universals. It reduces the totality of world quite more (see Warnke 1974/1981: 138).

(34) The often used category “complexity” grasps qualities only in a quantitative, formal form, not qualitatively, concretely in content. Our theory of self-organization understands only the form of processes and evolution, not the content. It says how processes and evolution work, but not, what is changing and where goes the evolution.

(35) Like classical physics the theory of self-organization “doesn’t exclude history, but it doesn’t grasp it immediately” (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1989: 133). The described processes are nothing but moments of complete cycles of evolution; they don’t describe the development itself. We can reproduce the emergence of new structures formally, but we are not able to grasp (“begreifen”, not only “verstehen”) its concrete content.

(35.1) 16.03.2004, 22:24, Annette Schlemm: Hegelian categories differ between „Verstand“ and „Vernunft“ (see http://www.thur.de/philo/hegel/hegel_en1.htm ).

(36) The problem of emergence can’t be solved.

That physics neither can be turned into a theory of development or can describe the world in its totality results from the fact that it has to determine and presuppose etalons in order to become a measuring science. (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1999: 256)

Determinism in Science

(37) Our scientific results have to be used in our practice. But in which way they influence our orientation? Usually there is discussed the deductive-nomological view on explanation and prediction using scientific laws. We can derive a deduction or conclusion from premises, which contain a law. (Hempel 1965; explained by Hofkirchner 2003, 136). Here concrete, real facts are taken as subsumed by “covering laws”.

(38) This view is only one interpretation of real science. It takes the (logical) form of the results of science and doesn’t take into consideration the scientific work of human beings as a process . If we expand philosophy of science from pure logic to analysis of science as such a process we’ll understand that even Newtonian theory can’t be reduced to an abstract deductive-nomological view. Even in the Newtonian theory a scientific fact is never “considered as an event that is mechanistically determined by laws” (Myelkow). The mechanicistic interpretation of the Newtonian theory, like shown by Hofkirchner (Hofkirchner 2003, 139), is only one, the most famous interpretation. But it isn’t the only one! We needn’t identify this interpretation of the theory with the content of the theory itself.

(38.1) 16.03.2004, 22:25, Annette Schlemm: Hofkirchner describes the interpretation of the third axiom of Newtonian theory (actio est reactio) as cause-effect-causation. Sometimes the second axiom is interpreted as causation (of acceleration by forces), too. But the content of the second axiom is only that the quantity of acceleration is proportional to the quantity of force. The force F is not a cause (that would be an overinterpretation of Newtonians terms), it is a “symbol for the term which had still to be introduced” (Borzeszkowski, Wahsner 1998, 21). Force is not a directed cause from one object to another one, it expresses a mutually relation between them. The third axiom limits the possible force terms which must be inserted in the second axiom (ibid., 21).

(39) When we want to determine, how natural or other laws determine our possibilities or our acting we have to differ between several types of determination. Causation is only one of them. And law and causation is not the same (even in classical sciences). What are important aspects of this problem?

Law and system hierarchy

(40) In Schlemm (2003a: 56) I wrote about the relativity of lawfulness relating to the hierarchical system structure. We can’t determine whether the “world itself” is strictly determined or not. Therefore a dialectic of necessary (behaviour of the system) and chance (within the behaviour of the elements) is given in classical sciences, too.

Difference of law and causality

(41) A law is determined to describe the “general, necessary, and essential connections in the interacting system” (Hörz 1982: 217). Causality – in difference – is the effect on a system as a cause, which through a given complex of conditions leads to a field of possibilities, from which possibilities are realized (Hörz 2003: 9).

(41.1) Re: Difference of law and causality, 16.03.2004, 22:25, Annette Schlemm: Causation implies an asymmetry in time, but causation is not a process, in which cause would be before effect. Cause and effect are logically simultaneous: “It is in the effect that the cause first becomes actual and a cause” (Hegel, Enc.I: 298). Also accidental events are caused, because no event or object is taken out from the universal connections of the world. To speak about dialectical causation we needn’t reduce it to a view that from a certain cause arises a certain effect.

(42) Causation is not the only determination, the variety of conditions can’t be described merely by causation (Hörz 2003: 10). Whereas a law is a reproducible and universal-necessary connection, causality is the directed mediation of a lawful connection in time. „Each law exists as connection in a complex of causal relations” (Hörz 1976a: 371), but it is not identical with “causation” itself.

(42.1) 16.03.2004, 22:25, Annette Schlemm: Sometimes there is spoken about a “law of causality”. It may be understood as a principle (not as a natural law) that says that all effects are caused (cf. Hörz 2003: 12).

Difference of law and conditions

(43) Laws are not only “general, necessary, and essential connections” at all, but “under certain conditions” (ibid.: 366). The law doesn’t describe directly the behaviour of objects. It describes only the possible behaviour and additional (real) initial and boundary conditions determine the (real) behaviour of the objects. If there are planets around a star they’ll behave like written in the Keplerian laws. But how many planets around a star and where they are is a question outside these laws. With respect to these laws these aspects are accidental.

Difference of reality and possibility

(44) The Newtonian law of motion [ d/dt (mv) = F ] gives an infinite set of possible trajectories. To get a description of real motion we have to add specific initial conditions. This formula is not absolute abstract because it describes actual possibilities. But it doesn’t describe the reality itself, the real process, because it gives only the possibilities.

(44.1) Re: Difference of reality and possibility, 16.03.2004, 22:28, Annette Schlemm: Specifying dialectic of necessity and chance
Also classical physics doesn’t deal only with strictly determined processes. The role of conditions and the difference between causality and law is valid for that science, too. Therefore already in this type of science we have to take into consideration a dialectic of necessity and chance. “Dialectical Determinism” doesn’t mean strict causation, but the “theory, that all objects and processes are conditioned and determined within an entire connection with other objects and processes (Hörz 1976a: 356). This corresponds with the “less-than-strict-determinism” (Hofkirchner 2003: 135). The view on determinism depends on the level: a “system” is defined to be a self-reproducing entity and therefore we get a dynamical law for the behaviour of the systems.
(The difference of dynamical and pure statistical and integrated laws is explained in http://www.thur.de/philo/project/intlaw.htm )
Its elements may have more “freedom”; their behaviour isn’t fully determined by the laws of the system. (see: Law and system hierarchy). There is a connection, a unity of the accidental behaviour of the elements and the necessary tendency of the system. “… The can-be is also lawful” (Bloch SO: 172).
Integrated Law
All these aspects are united in the Integrated law (called by H. Hörz, who established it, “Statistical Law): The philosophical conception of the statistical law regards laws (systems of laws) as general, necessary, and essential connections between objects and processes in a system, where, under the conditions of the system, a possibility is necessarily realized (dynamic aspect), but where there is a field of possibilities for the elements. A probability distribution exists for the random realization of this field (stochastic aspect) and the transition from one state into another is conditionally realizes by chance with a certain degree of probability (probabilistic aspect). (Hörz 1982: 215) Necessity is given, if a wholeness of conditions is given. In each concrete situation the given wholeness of conditions select the “necessarily realizing” possibility (possibilities). If our existence and actions are parts of conditions, we can select or create new conditions (building bridges or houses!)

Emergence of new fields of possibility

(45) When we take into consideration the decisive role of conditions, we can estimate that a change of conditions can also change the operation of laws. Within laws there is a given field of possibilities for the behaviour of the elements. As long as the field of possibilities is stable, the stochastical distribution may change. This is called modification type I by Hörz and Wessel (1983: 134). But the field of possibilities may also change, firstly as long as the dynamic aspect remains (modification type II, ibid.). We know that in real evolution processes there is another modification type: the law itself may vanish, if its conditions of existence are vanishing. Depending on the new conditions other laws will emerge and their fields of possibilities, too. In this connection we find the “emergence of causes” (Dobronravova 2003, 21), too, but in a wider view.

(46) The new sciences, like theory of self-organisation, add some new aspects into this view. The most important new aspect is the high sensibility to small accidental influences at the bifurcation points (Dobronravova 2003, 19), sometimes called “effect of butterflies”. This characterizes a specific “chance”, spontaneity as the “third kind” of determination between determinism and indeterminism (Myelkow 2003, 78), the decisive role of a “singular individual” (Niedersen 1990: 79; cf. Schlemm 2003a: 69). Already in 1967 Herbert Hörz spoke about such situations, he mentioned the “essential chance” (Hörz 1967: 864), which can lead to qualitative changes of systems. After development of self-organisation-theories we can specify our knowledge about the constitutive role of chances. We know about fluctuations as “variations between two possible states of the system at least, from which one possible state realises itself, without possibility of determination of the conditions for this possibility” (Hörz 2002).

(47) The modification of fields of possibilities are connected with the possibility of ramifying at bifurcation points.

(47.1) 16.03.2004, 22:32, Annette Schlemm: The interpretation of ramifying as process in time requires the (not self-evident) correspondence of the increasing parameter with time.

(48) We have to take into consideration the breaking of symmetries in a new way (Hörz 1988: 217). It is clear, that new properties, developing in the process of self-organisation, “cannot be predicted from even perfect knowledge of the old properties” (Brunner, Klauninger 2003, 323f.).

The determination of each step of non-linear dynamics with the help of iteration formulas in non-linear studies does not provide the possibility of long-term predictions due to the influences of small differences in parameter values (these differences already exist at least because of quantum fluctuations. (Dobronravova 2003, 22)

Philosophy of Future

(49) Knowing
All our knowledge can’t say us what will happen. Firstly we have to take into consideration the difference of our knowledge and the real world because of the epistemological preassumtions and secondly, the knowledge itself contains fields of possibilities.

By means of statistical laws we can give trends of future, but we can’t set up exact forecasts. (Hörz 2002).

(50) We mustn’t identify a law with a tendency, because it’s possible and necessary to combine contradicting tendencies, too (Hörz 1974: 1211). Only fields of possibilities and distributions of probability are given in an objective sense (Hörz 1976b: 960).

Historical necessity, field of possibilities, conditions and distributions of probability remain objective, can be recognised and can be used by the selection of the possibility, which will be realised. (Hörz 1974: 1209)

(51) The world is not absolutely undetermined. Because of mutual interactions, of a general coherence of worldly processes we can understand components of these determinations. Because of given conditions in each moment the evolution contains “relative goals”, which are the main-tendencies within a given field of possibility (see Hörz 2002). In society there are more mediations between objectively given conditions and subjective behaviour than in nature without conscious beings. The societal life of humans gives them the additional possibility to change the conditions of their society, too. Therefore the acting of human beings is rather more free than determined by given laws. But law and freedom are not only contradictions, they need each other in a dialectic way.


(52) We can only speak about the dialectic of law and freedom if we speak about practical life, about actions of humans. Although human acting may overcome (societal) laws, its effectiveness depends simultaneously on the existence of laws.

By means of statistical laws we can give trends of future, but we can’t set up exact forecasts. The contrast to a mechanistical view isn’t connected with the view that future wouldn’t be designable. World is changing within laws and not without rules (Hörz 2002).

(53) We spoke about objective „relative goals“. People can decide freely, whether they want to realize such a goal or if they change the conditions in another way. Only if such a decision is taken, now “objective demands” exist to reach such a decided goal. In order to reach the goal the conditions have to be changed in the right way, depending on determinations and laws. In such a way “freedom is realised necessity, because freedom of actions is really mediated with the law of necessity” (Bloch 1954: 546). “Will is matched with the course of the things” (ibid.) and will becomes an “especially active part of the realised tendency” (ibid.). The societal acting of human beings becomes a part of the conditions (Hörz 1973: 182).

”The subjective factor may change the layer of conditions, may cancel them or create new conditions. But it can’t change the laws, which are prerequisites of changing, cancelling and creating.” (Bloch 1954: 548)

Strategies of acting between knowledge of conditions and goals (Schlemm 1999: 153, see also Schlemm 1998)

(54) Sciences of society can show, „which essential conditions have to be realised, in order to realize the wished possibility” (Hörz 1967: 864). Human beings are able to act, “producing the conditions, which are realising the possibility which is contained in the law and which is wished” (ibid.: 865). In this way we get a “responsible activism” (dialectic of the feasible and the desirable) (Hofkirchner 2003, 148). Knowledge doesn’t directly give instructions for actions and our subjective will can’t immediately change the reality. We have to analyse several mediations like norms and interests.

”Freedom in action isn’t a amuck run, but active unison with matured and maturing lawful conditions. Objective law is not a boundary, but a helpful baton for a demand, which aims at a better future. ” (Bloch 1954: 566)

(55) Sometimes the possibility to decide within a given field of possibility is stressed (Hörz 1968: 331). Sometimes there is said that there can emerge new scopes (Hörz 1968: 331).

”Freedom is realizing of possibilities as goals of acting, which are contained in the field of possibilities of laws, based on competent decisions. ” (Hörz 1991: 75).

(56) Laws themselves can be modified by changing the fields of possibility and probabilities (Hörz, Wessel 1983: 134). But the most important possibility of acting is the change the existence of fundamental laws at all. The question, whether this possibility is taken into consideration, distinguishes different types of future-research.

(57) Another question is whether the given conditions or the goals are primary. Usually we think that the real world, the given conditions are the starting point. But human beings are not only products of their conditions, they have the ability to anticipate and anticipation determines their motivations. Therefore “not the hardness of their situation and the imposed suffering are motives to think another state, in which the people would have a better life; on the contrary toil and suffering reveal in a different light and we decide that they are unbearable from that day we can think another state.” (Sartre 1943: 756).

(58) Because of this dialectic of acting and knowing human freedom doesn’t need indeterminism. Because all parts of the world are connected in a (dialectially) determined way, we have possibilities to change them by creating new societal laws, new fields of possibilities and selections from that fields. The laws and fields of possibilities in society are mainly determined by the evolution of productive forces (which contain human abilities and needs!). But the individual behaviour of human beings has another type of individual possibility. With respect to societal laws humans are “only” the elements, they have their own field of possibilities (cf. Holzkamp 1983). Therefore individuals not only products of their societal environment, “one is always responsible for what is made of one” (Sartre 1969: 45).

(58.1) the other is to responsibilised for what is made the other (uvvell Martre 2004), 17.03.2004, 01:24, Uwe Berger: There is no individual behavior, no individual possibilities, there are only societal humans (oben fehlt ein Komma nach laws) and only a "hand-full" lawyers. And soon gets well as sound as a bell, when you the one of the medic smell. Within three people might be a law, all what someone can use is useless. (O.W.confuse) Lets create more lawyers :)


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